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Resumo 
Durante a década de 1970, por vez primeira na história política do Cone Sul, produziu-se a 
integração supranacional entre as diferentes ditaduras da região. Estas intensificaram a ação 
repressiva estatal, pondo em funcionamento uma maquinaria de guerra estatal contrarrevoluci-
onaria, com um claro desejo de liquidação, que atingiu uma realização objetiva através do de-
saparecimento de pessoas e a disseminação do terror. Como resultante desse processo, que não 
conheceu fronteiras nacionais nem limites ideológicos, ficou a em massa violação aos direitos 
humanos; por outro lado e a partir disso, no campo das ciências sociais se empregou a concep-
tualização de terrorismo de Estado dantes de que sua precisão conceptual permitisse unicidade 
de critérios. Este artigo realiza uma reflexão teórico conceptual para avançar no entendimento 
dos mecanismos específicos de aparecimento, expansão e transnacionalização do terrorismo 
de Estado. Com o estudo concreto da chamada Operação Condor, que demonstrou cabalmente 
a integração das ditaduras de Argentina, Bolívia, Brasil, Chile, Paraguai e Uruguai. 
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Abstract 
During the 1970s, for the first time in the political history of the Southern Cone, supranation-
al integration between the different dictatorships of the region took place. These intensified 
state repressive action, putting into operation a counterrevolutionary state war machine with 
a clear desire for liquidation, which reached an objective realization through the disappear-
ance of people and the spread of terror. As a result of this process, which knew no national 
boundaries or ideological boundaries, there was a massive violation of human rights; on the 
other hand, and from this, in the field of social sciences the conceptualization of State terror-
ism was used before its conceptual precision allowed for unicity of criteria. This article pre-
sents a theoretical conceptual reflection to advance the understanding of the specific mecha-
nisms of the emergence, expansion and transnationalization of State terrorism. With the con-
crete study of the Operation Condor, which fully demonstrated the integration of the dictator-
ships of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
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Terrorismo de Estado: uma integração supranacional 
(América do Sul, durante os anos 70) 
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Introduction 
 The following essay deals with a State Terrorism 
analysis as well as with the precise study of its develop-
ment in South America during the 1970s, which be-
came evident by means of a qualitative and deep 
change within the own notion of State. 
It is known that the State holds the monopoly of 
legal violence and, in accordance with that power, it has 
every possible legal resource to increase repression 
measures supervised by coercion institutions. However, 
as it is the case presented in this essay, the State can 
release itself from the limitations associated with the 
rule of law, and according to particular intimidation 
purposes against political opponent (previously turned 
into political enemies), the State, in one way or another, 
can systematically carry out terrorist activities (Cañón, 
2012). In the case we are about to tackle here, that 
change set up a new idea of repressive profile which 
characterized the different dictatorships until the 1960s. 
The aim of this investigation is related to the 
social historical horizon of a region afflicted with a 
lasting hegemony crisis. The context and the worth 
mentioning social conditions of that time are the impos-
sibility for the historical parties in power to make a 
long lasting political hegemony possible, as well as 
their inability to act as an integrating class and to per-
form actions that may increase their supportive basis. 
All those aspects are not indifferent to the process 
through which the Armed Forces failed to act as a lead-
ing figure of the political system to start fulfilling a de-
cisive part in the relationships State/class and State/
society. 
This study is based upon the idea that the new 
role conferred to the State and, within it, to the army, is 
connected with the prefiguration of a new kind of polit-
ical power and with the performance of regressive eco-
nomic and social measures which articulate a new mod-
el of accumulation and reproduction of the capital. The 
deep and structural roots which explain it are to be 
found in the transnational character of bourgeoisie his-
torically allied and dependent on central capitalism 
powers and on the way the army acted as a safeguard of 
such alliance. 
The decisive role of the army in this process and 
its change of attitude towards a new kind of activity 
(the interior security and the war against an inner ene-
my) occurred under the influence of two military cor-
puses. On the one hand, the National Security Doctrine, 
regarded as a political ideological and cultural elite 
sympathizer of the U.S. capitalist interest, which meant 
an expanding domination on the part of that country 
since the second half of the twentieth century. On the 
other hand, the ideals of Modern War, theory of the 
counterrevolutionary action developed by the French 
colonial army after its experiences in both Indochina 
(1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962), represented a 
new definition of how military conflicts should be un-
derstood as it replaced the classic concept of confronta-
tion among states with another kind of confrontation 
which was among individuals. It also changed the con-
cept of fighting for territorial control by an ideological 
control of society. Between both doctrines there are, 
however, a lot of points in common. It is from those 
points in common that the premise supported and 
spread by such doctrines regarding the existence of an 
enemy striking inside of national societies comes out. 
While the army members received training in 
counter-insurgency techniques in both American and 
French academies, the most conservative and influen-
tial circles of South-American leading classes were 
considering a deep guideline revision of the political 
organization of their societies (Cañón, 2015). Both pro-
cesses joined together, opening the way to the idea of 
the establishment of a state rationality based on inner 
security, and building a model of a constant alert State 
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included within the principle of domestic war. From the 
scores of power, a new ideological conception was ar-
ranged aiming to articulate institutional mechanisms of 
both social and political discipline. The real State’s 
strength -to control, follow and repress- increased. Se-
curity and intelligence were placed under army surveil-
lance. Everything was subordinated to national security. 
Although this idea fits in a specific period deter-
mined by the Cold War, it does not explain neither how 
or why they fought in imaginary battle fields (but with 
real, human beings made of flesh and bone) against a 
mythical entity, a terrifying enemy: the communism-
inspired subversion. It was a social construction that 
from a “we” saw the other one as an aggressor; crystal-
lization of an exclusive way of thinking that viewed the 
other one not only by opposition but also in opposition:  
“When it comes to make up a fantastic monster, an ide-
ological offensive always arises, followed by cam-
paigns to destroy it. You cannot attack if the enemy is 
able to defend itself: it would be far too risky. But, 
however, if you feel confident that it can be overcome, 
you might knock it off soon and give another sign of 
relief afterwards” (Chomsky, 2005: 32). 
The discursive construction of the subversive 
concept gradually colonized the institutional framework 
of nations, to such extent that they became the execut-
ers of a violence rationally aimed at the removal, the 
destruction or, at least, the weakening of those declared 
as enemies. 
 
Situation: from the coups to  
State Terrorism 
 
 All along the twentieth century, most part of 
American nations were immersed in both constitutional 
and de facto government’s succession, generally on ac-
count of coups favored and executed by the army of 
those countries. As for social sciences, inquiries were 
conducted to find out why the institutional development 
alteration reached the status of norm. 
According to Alain Rouquié (1982), the Latin-
American authoritarianism and the regularity of the 
coup allow us to consider those countries as militarized 
ones. Other important views are taken by Guillermo 
O’Donnell, who described the militarized countries of 
the region as bureaucratic and authoritarians. Those 
would be characterized, in O’Donnell’ s (1972) opin-
ion, by their tendency to impose a massive exclusion of 
the democratic participation of citizenships right at the 
time when they claim to be willing to achieve a wider 
modernization. 
Alain Touraine is against approaches like 
O’Donnell’s, considering them to be unsuitable for the 
American scene. On the contrary, he proposes the anti-
popular model of state. His reflections on the different 
ways of military interventions lead him to consider 
them as anti-popular dictatorships where the authoritar-
ian exercise power and, unlike fascism, the purely re-
pressive control over people replace the ideological and 
military mobilization. For Touraine (1982) the anti-
popular repression is the common factor that allows us 
to place all the authoritarian regimes in the American 
continent at the same level. These three works, focused 
on the authoritarian character of military regimes, creat-
ed the core from which a lot of subsequent investiga-
tion started. 
Other investigation lines have taken care of 
finding out the causal factor of military intervention-
ism. Such autonomy would be the result of a process 
where the army is turning from temporary inspectors to 
work out particular crises to authorized parts of the na-
tion interest (González Casanova, 1977). Such transfor-
mation would become a continental experience since 
the military regime held in Brazil, after the coup against 
president Joao Goulart (03/31/64), which turned out to 
be the first Latin-American country founded according 
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to the ideas of the National Security Doctrine, in order 
to impose its viewpoint to the rest of the coup attempt 
supporters in Latin-American inland (Calvo, 1979). 
Consequently, a number of works devoted to the emer-
gency of military dictatorships in the southern cone un-
der the influence of the National Security Doctrine, 
such as those by Jorge Tapia (1980) in Chile and Brazil, 
Enrique Vázquez (1985) in Argentina, emphasized the 
reactionary and conservative root of South-American 
military bodies. As Prudencio García (1995) describes 
it, the army’s autonomy is founded on the certainty of 
some army officers that they can and must intervene in 
major national policy problems. 
One of the most clarifying efforts of understand-
ing, but perhaps with less empirical development in 
connection with the emergency of dictatorships in Latin
-America and its relationship with the socio-economic 
conditions is the work of the historian Perry Anderson 
(1988). His central idea lies in what he calls “populist 
inflexion”, which is a consequence of a relationship 
between agricultural capital and industrial work. Ac-
cording to Anderson, the emergency of the dictatorships 
would be explained by its own function: traumatize the 
civil society with a big enough dose of terror, to frus-
trate any possible idea of social change from its core. 
He claims that all military regimes that appeared in Lat-
in-America from the middle 1960s onwards were coun-
terrevolutionaries and preventives, having as a main 
function behead and delete lefty parties, which did not 
coincide with the capitalist way of production. In this 
way, it added up a new element to define these military 
regimes, that is, having stipulated, as part of its recon-
struction work, the reintroduction of a controlled capi-
talist democracy. 
The brief analysis of most of the ideas about 
military interventionism allows us to start digging 
deeper in the analysis of state terrorism. In relation to 
this, it’s important to emphasize that each and every 
investigation concerning this issue demonstrates the 
existing difficulties to provide a notion of understand-
ing. According to Alex Schmid (1983), most of the def-
initions have a lot of elements in common which help 
us considering both nationwide terrorism and terrorism 
against the nation. 
Adam Roberts (2002) points out how the defini-
tion of terrorism was at first meant to define dictator-
ships and terror governments to be, later on, used for 
the designating groups that, from the last years of the 
nineteenth century on, murdered political leaders and 
heads of state. In its first meaning, terrorism is close to 
the French revolution period where the state adopts the 
reign of terror ways (1773-1794). One of the first opin-
ions about the terror government was given by Edmund 
Burke (1790) to whom the French revolutionary gov-
ernment ruled like tyrants by means of terror. Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1856) studied the relationship between 
violence and revolution, paying special attention to vio-
lence. All along the nineteenth century, the limited 
meaning of the word terrorism widened out to explain 
the exercise of every public demonstration of those 
groups interested in the promotion of their ideals by 
violent means. 
In the last years, as Elias Padilla Ballesteros 
(2001) verifies, starting from all the different human 
right violation by state officers from several countries, 
the concept of terrorism of state has been used before 
its concept precision allows a unity of opinions. Nowa-
days, those difficulties have become tougher in view of 
the validity of a discreditable speech towards all those 
who try to oppose to the state activities; to those who 
are included within the definition of “terrorist”, denying 
the right to both resistance and disobedience. 
Boaz Ganor defines terrorism as “the premedi-
tated use of violence or the threat to use it against civil 
population or civil objectives to obtain political bene-
fits” (Ganor, 2001: 15). He excludes all those political 
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actions which do not resort to violence and demonstra-
tions, strikes or any other way of civil disobedience. It 
also excludes those violent actions against the army or 
the police, some actions from certain guerrillas or urban 
disturbances. In the same direction, Peter Waldmann’s 
ideas distinguish between guerrillas and strictly speak-
ing terrorism: “by terrorism I understand violent attacks 
against a political order prepared and organized from 
secrecy. Its purpose is to spread insecurity and fear, but 
also sympathy and predisposition to sup-
port” (Waldmann, 2007: 62). 
Waldmann’s operational approach, very similar 
to the French military logic about counterinsurgency, is 
complemented by his consideration of terrorism as a 
strategy of communication. 
However, according to this author, there is not 
such a terrorism of state because he considers that ter-
rorism comes from an idea against the political order, 
even though he admits that state elites can set up a 
reign of terror. As a consequence, for Waldmann, terror-
ism is a way of attacking the state and the established 
order; and terror is a state strategy to create panic and 
terror. Difference is then qualitative: “it depends on 
whether violence is used to keep the power or to change 
its situation” (Waldmann, 2007: 69). The objective of 
this essay prevents us from continuing along the reflex-
ive path suggested by Waldamann, but nonetheless we 
must keep some elements in mind such as secrecy, fear 
and lack of safety. 
Sharing a similar view, Hugo Frühling excludes 
state terrorism as a way of terrorism itself and suggests 
the following definition: “insurrectionary military-like 
strategy, used by small groups to preferably attack civil 
targets and whose main goal is to weaken the state and 
to prepare the conditions for its collapse” (Frühling, 
1995: 7). 
Rafael Calduch (1999: 339) notices some differ-
ences between social terrorism and state terrorism. For 
him, the main feature of the later is its straight applica-
tion by state members. However, this characterization is 
incomplete, because it leaves an extensive range of pos-
sibilities aside such as the state developing national 
forces to carry out terrorist practices. 
William Schulz clarifies that State Terrorism is 
not a new topic and, just like conventional terrorism, it 
has historically been constructed: “The reasons through 
which a ruling elite decides to give preference to some 
sorts of terror over others (for instance, crucifixion, in-
stead of stoning; public execution instead of a private 
one; the disappearance of people more frequently than 
with the traditional political murder; the use of mental 
hospitals to replace jails) leads to another important 
aspect concerning this matter: the political psychology 
of state terrorism” (Schulz, 1990: 33). 
This author brings up that average repression 
(law-abiding) and the state terrorism (violating national 
and international law) can be used within two different 
contexts: to defend a particular established system of 
production and appropriation, either for the expansion 
of some production relations, or their creation in places 
where they were not yet established. 
Therefore, according to Schulz, the intensity in 
which the two forms of systematic repression are used 
depends on both the threat nature and dimension to 
which the system is exposed. In this way, ab elite with-
in power resorts to terrorist methods whenever their 
ordinary repression ways and their hegemony controls 
prove to be ineffective to neutralize the threat. The 
State Terrorism can actually act in two different ways: 
directly, by means of agencies inside the state itself; 
indirectly, providing substitute entities (proxy entities) 
such as other states or other groups and individuals. 
Regarding the aforementioned view, Miguel 
Bonasso distinguishes between terrorism and State Ter-
rorism. In Bonasso’s words, “terrorism involves groups 
of people or individuals who lack the repressive power 
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of the state and use violence to express their opposition 
to that power, trying to undermine it” (Bonasso, 1990: 
9). On the other hand, State Terrorism involves an ideo-
logical and political framework of the legal repression 
and appeals to unconventional methods, both extensive 
and intensive, to annihilate political opposition and so-
cial protest demonstrations, whether they are armed or 
disarmed (Bonasso, 1990: 10). 
From a different perspective, Ernesto Garzón 
(1990) analyses the concept of State Terrorism taking 
into account its real legitimacy and its ethical illegiti-
macy. According to Garzón, there is a sum of elements 
which must be present in the exercise of State power to 
be considered terrorism of state. The existence of a ver-
tical war with an enemy infiltrated in every area of so-
ciety, that works a part of an international network 
whose aim is the elimination of accepted values by 
those in power. The imprecise delimitation of punisha-
ble actions and elimination of any judicial process in 
order to determine the existence of a crime; the clan-
destine imposition of measures of national sanction 
prohibited by the legal order officially proclaimed 
(tortured and homicides, among others). The unclear 
application of violent measures of liberty, property or 
life loss, disregarding in many cases the identity of the 
addressee of such measures and of the actions or omis-
sions of which they might be held responsible; the use 
of violence on innocent people. Actually, this helps to 
strengthen the efficiency of terror; to fill the population 
with the real fear that, under mortal circumstances, no-
body is safe from the arbitrary coercion by government 
members. 
All that removes the idea of transgression from 
the legal system, so everybody can be a transgressor. 
This ambiguity about who are the addressees of the co-
ercive measures and about the unclear definition of the 
pursuit groups, aims to raise fear and to impose intimi-
dation. The mixture of these features, helps Ernesto 
Garzón formulate the following definition of terrorism 
of state: “The State Terrorism is a form of state power 
exercise whose rule recognition allow or/and impose, 
with the purpose of creating wide-spread fear, the clan-
destine application, unpredictable and unclear, also to 
people clearly innocent, of coercive measures forbidden 
by the proclaimed legal system. This hinders or de-
clares legal activity null and turns the government into 
an active agent eager to be in power” (Garzón, 1990: 
147) 
Wrapping up his definition of State Terrorism, 
he refers to the most important elements, from an insti-
tutional point of view: “An ideological organization 
whose core is a dogma, an idea useful as an absolute 
guideline, unquestionable, and handy as an excuse to 
destroy everything that goes against it. An efficient 
team of propaganda to account for the measures ap-
plied, resisting and stigmatizing opposite positions. The 
culture of the own image as a compensation for actions 
of cruelty: elimination of the self-criticism capacity by 
means of the machinery of inner discipline” (Garzón, 
1990: 147-149). 
All these elements can be found in the views, 
developed with unquestionable care and intellectual 
originality by Hannah Arendt: “terror in a totalitarian 
government is no longer a simple way to abolish oppo-
sition […] its main goal is to make possible that the 
strength of nature (Nazism) or history (Marxism) runs 
freely along mankind without stumbling against any 
spontaneous action […] It is this movement the one that 
distinguishes mankind enemies against who spark off 
terror, an no action or opposition can be allowed that 
hinders the elimination of the so-called enemy-
objective of history or nature, of class or race. The guilt 
and the innocence become meaningless notions; guilty 
is he who stands in the way of natural and historical 
process […] terror, as an execution of a movement law 
whose last aim is not people’s welfare or one single 
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person’s interest but the rebuilding of mankind. It re-
moves individuals in favor of the species, sacrifice the 
parts to support the whole […] at the same time as log-
ic, regarded as a movement of thought, rather than as a 
necessary thought control, is applied to an idea, this 
idea becomes a premise […] as terror is needed to 
avoid that, with the birth of any new human being, a 
new start arises, making himself/herself heard, like-
wise, the coercive strength of logic is mobilized to pre-
vent everybody from starting to think that, as the freest 
and purest of all human activities, is well and truly the 
opposite of the mandatory deduction process […] what 
kind of basic experience in the social life of men per-
vades a form of government, the essence of which is 
terror and whose principle of action is the logic of ideo-
logical thought” (Arendt, 1998: 372-373; 376-379). 
In this recap, it remains noteworthy the refer-
ence to the classic Eduardo Luis Duhalde’s work. By 
means of different pieces of evidence, he succeeded to 
expose the model used in the military concentration 
camps during Argentine military dictatorship (1976-
1983) where prisoners’ personality destruction was the 
main target by the systematic use of both physical and 
moral torture. The setting up of State Terrorism was 
achieved, in Duhalde’s words, by the systematic appli-
cation of threats and reprisals in order to impose obedi-
ence (Duhalde, 1983). 
Alexander George developed the theory of the 
so-called “global parallelism”, which means the use of 
repressive mechanisms considered illegal even within 
each country’s legislation; and a consistent clandestine 
application of repressive actions. As for George, the 
concept of State Terrorism implies that: “A state, seek-
ing protection in the legitimacy of its actions, clandes-
tinely and outside the law uses the same procedures that 
terrorist groups apply to scare any given citizenship 
and, by doing so, it reaches either social, political or 
military objectives, or even promotes behaviors that 
would not be achieved any other way” (George, 1991: 
30). 
In several approaches to the matter in question, 
Noam Chomsky has brought up the disagreement inex-
istence as far as terrorism definition is concerned. From 
what Chomsky reports, the word refers to the threat or 
to the use of violence, generally, for political purposes 
and against non-combatant civil citizens. In Chomsky’s 
view, both State and individual terrorism depend on the 
source of planning and operation, or it is a mixture of 
them, when the individual terrorism operates under 
state orders or under its direction and support 
(Chomsky, 2002). 
Taking reflections on investigations described 
so far as a starting point, the examination of several 
sources and the approaches stated in previous works, 
we will as well try to outline the typical concepts of 
State Terrorism. Such notion should contain: the use of 
repressive force against civil population by a State, fos-
tered by political objectives, as a reaction against the 
interference of cultural values considered to be alien to 
the country tradition. 
Bearing in mind what has been previously men-
tioned, it would be worth referring to such things as the 
systematic use of policies and practices, authoritarian 
and repressive by a State in accordance with some ob-
jectives to reorganize society. The execution of those 
policies can be carried out directly, by official staff; or 
indirectly, by means of agents unconnected with the 
State, but whose actions meet the orders of the state. 
Regardless of who the executor might be, the reason 
that causes its need lies in the wish to impose models of 
behavior desirable from the top authorities willing to 
eliminate from the social relations scene the behaviors 
considered unwelcomed and the programs which aim to 
modify established order. A discipline project got start-
ed using clandestine practices whose execution can 
even try to remain hidden. Starting a first series of up-
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setting situations for the social community by the state -
whose main function should be the security of citizen-
ship- that state turns into one that disregards people’s 
security and makes an illegal use of violence. State Ter-
rorism not only characterizes itself by actions of state 
violence pursuit, but also by establishing a general feel-
ing of fear in the population. 
 
The entente of terror, the Condor  
Operation 
 
Until the middle 1960s, the South-American 
military governments in force adopted the typology of a 
temporary authoritarian regime. Such regimes did not 
reject democracy as a way of social organization of the 
country and did not try to change the nature of the state 
itself, only a momentary interruption of both political 
and social liberties of their respective republican re-
gimes and increase of repressive actions.  
However, by the end of the 1960s, and under the 
influence of both American and French policies that 
emphasized the need of a massive political will to face 
an inner enemy looking for a situation of vulnerability 
in safety, a doctrinal change began to be build accord-
ing to the profile of the military interventionism, as-
suming ideas that were against the main basis of a de-
mocracy state. It was considered that the principle of 
legality, the respect to the essential content of basic 
rights and the jurisdictional control of the above-
mentioned rights, limited the power of the state to guar-
antee the security of the society. Therefore, a new state 
model was arranged, the National Security State, a pe-
culiar form of State of exception which granted to the 
army the power to carry out the eradication of the sub-
version and the rearrangement of the nation (in the case 
of Paraguay, with a dictatorship prevailing since 1954, 
a change took place in the practices; in Brazil the model 
that turned out to be the 1964 coup was intensified; and 
in Argentina it happened even before the army took real 
control of the state)1. 
The strategy of destruction was developed in a 
nationwide scale with a repressive integration of re-
gional character: the Condor Operation. This coordinat-
ed action, whose aim was not just to eradicate subver-
sion, understood as the killing of people considered to 
be subversive, but also all kind of thought tending to-
wards the free exercise of criticism. 
As Stella Calloni claims, the discovery of the so
-called Archives of Terror2, allowed the understanding 
of the role of dictatorial governments and also the part 
of CIA and another U.S. Institutions in the use of the 
idea of the National Security Doctrine by the different 
dictatorships (Calloni, 1999). This is something that 
Patrice McSherry worked on lately; in a way, she takes 
Perry Anderson’s hypothesis about the social classes 
struggle in the south cone of Latin America and estab-
lishes a relation with the action of the army in some 
countries that have been historically against each other 
(McSherry, 2009). 
The documents of the aforementioned corpus 
actually allow the reconstruction of the basis and the 
repressive methodology of Condor Operation. Its de-
tailed description can be found in the cable sent by the 
FBI special agent, Coroner Robert Scherrer (assigned in 
different US diplomatic quarters and that, from 1972, 
was the legal assistant in the US Embassy in Buenos 
Aires) to the FBI director: "`Operation Condor´ is the 
code name for the collection, exchange and storage of 
1Giorgio Agamben (2004), understands and bases State of Exception “allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire 
categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (Agamben, 2004, p. 25). 
2The Archives of Terror were found on December 22, 1992. URL http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239a/index.htm [accessed  12 
january 2010]. 
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intelligence data concerning so-called `leftists,´ com-
munists and Marxists, which was recently established 
between cooperating intelligence services in South 
America in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activi-
ties in the area. In addition, `Operation Condor´ pro-
vides for joint operations against terrorist targets in 
member countries of `Operation Condor.´ Chile is the 
center for `Operation Condor´ and, in addition to Chile, 
its members include Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. Brazil also has tentatively agreed to supply 
intelligence input for `Operation Condor´. The mem-
bers of `Operation Condor´ that show the most enthusi-
asm to date have been Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. 
The last three countries have engaged in joint opera-
tions, primarily in Argentina, against the terrorist target. 
During the week of September 20th, 1976, the members 
of the Secretary of Information of the Argentinian State 
together with the Uruguayan intelligence service devel-
oped actions against the Uruguayan terrorist organiza-
tion OPR-33 in Argentina. The OPR-33 has been elimi-
nated  […]  
According to what has been informed, a third 
and very secret phase of the ‘Condor Operation’ had to 
do with building special teams in each country in order 
to perform operations such as murders of terrorists or of 
civilians who support their organizations. For instance, 
when a terrorist was identified as such, or a collaborator 
in a member country was discovered, a special team 
was sent to locate and watch the target. When the loca-
tion and surveillance operation was finished, a second 
team from "Operation Condor´" would be dispatched to 
carry out the actual sanction against the target. Special 
teams would receive false documentation from member 
countries of `Operation Condor´ and were integrated 
exclusively by individuals from one or more member 
nations of `Operation Condor´. European countries, 
specifically mentioned for possible operations under the 
third phase of `Operation Condor´, were France and 
Portugal.”3 
A secret combined operation to exterminate ene-
mies (lefties, communists, Marxists) enemies in com-
mon. Yet, the elimination required a previous step: the 
construction of the enemy itself. Enemies were identi-
fied as main figures of a dehumanization process, 
which lost the characteristics of human beings and, 
therefore, should be eliminated, but not only as a result 
of a ruthless and illegal repression but also in view of a 
new future role for the State. The projection of a new 
social order, of a new State, based upon the importance 
of the order and exclusion, colonized the political or-
ganization, going beyond the repressive legislation, 
reaching both education and organization of culture 
(Cañón, 2014). 
The beginning of this process systematization 
can be placed in the 1º Course of Counter-
Revolutionary War (Buenos Aires, 1961). Its purpose 
was to instruct military officers in the planning, man-
agement and execution of the counter-revolution. The 
program included the study of Marxist philosophy, the 
methods of penetration into society (infiltration) and 
techniques to both prevent and fight communism. The 
opening words of the course supervisor, General Tur-
olo, concerning objectives, speak for themselves: “the 
study of the fighting methods against the biggest enemy 
of our way of living, communism”4. As for the Lieuten-
ant General Poggi, Commander in chief of the Argen-
tine army, the course symbolized the unity of the whole 
American continent “to protect ourselves against any 
3This cable is from the FBI's legal attaché in Buenos Aires, Robert Scherrer. For more than two decades, it was almost the only released U.S. document 
that mentions Condor, and has been widely quoted in books and articles. URL http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch23-01.htm 
[accessed 4 september 2014]. 
4
Clarín,  3 october 1961. (Cited in Cañón, 2012b, p. 14)  
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danger, from inside or from outside”.5 
The Inter-American military conferences consti-
tuted an exceptional place for this process to get con-
solidated and, from 1960 onwards, they gathered annu-
ally in order to promote continental defense measures. 
In 1973, the Brazilian general, Breno Borges Fortes, 
made an evaluation of them: “We already have a num-
ber of achievements perfectly consolidated which are 
developing rapidly, such as the bilateral intelligence 
conferences and the conferences of the communications 
officers in command of the American armies that have 
already created a permanent commission of military 
communications (for its Spanish acronym, COPECO-
MI) and the settings up of the Inter-American military 
communications network (for its Spanish acronym, 
RECIM). We can also mention as a positive achieve-
ment of the above mentioned conferences the extension 
of students interchange inside the military schools of 
our countries, as well as military enlistments in friendly 
countries armies.”6 
On the other hand, if we consider the thematic 
main point that concerned the American Armies Con-
ference members from its creation in 1960 until the 
1983 conference; it can be observed how Marxism 
turned into a military, political, social and cultural prob-
lem. With these conferences as a background, the con-
cept of ideological borders appeared. During the V 
Conference (West Point 1964), the Argentine repre-
sentative, Major Chief in the Army, Lieutenant Colonel 
Juan Carlos Onganía, showed what was lately known as 
West Point Doctrine7. 
On this basis, surely backed by both national 
security and modern war ideals, a military ideology 
arose which was centered on the concept of a third 
world war, the bipolarity of world blocs, the combina-
tion of conventional and unconventional wars, the con-
tinental defense of America against an aggressive ideol-
ogy of communism and the confrontation against the 
inner enemy8. 
All these elements can be found in the counter-
revolutionary coordination that supported the Condor 
Operation. The draw up of this entente of terror took 
place in the First National Intelligence Business Meet-
ing in Santiago de Chile (November, December 1975). 
The representative members of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay agreed that their coun-
tries “were being politically, economically and military 
attacked from both inside and outside their frontiers”, 
and that until that moment they had faced that reality 
“fighting separately or at best either with bilateral 
agreements or well-mannered understandings”. In this 
meeting they proposed to fix that situation by bringing 
the security coordination system into operation, “in 
general terms, something similar to what INTERPOL 
has in Paris, but wholly devoted to subversion.” In a 
practical way, it supposed a major step in the transna-
tional repressive integration and in the control of the 
actions focused on destroying subversion which “does 
not recognize neither frontiers nor nations and let infil-
tration get inside all levels of the nation life.”10 As soon 
as the agreement was reached, repression had no longer 
limits nor frontiers. 
5Clarín,  3 october 1961. (Cited in Cañón, 2012b, p. 14) 
6La Opinión, 19 october 1975. 
7See Cañón, 2012, 2012b, 2014. 
8It should be noted the work of the War Colleges of each country, Pan-American Conference, Organizatin of  American State, Inter-American Defense 
College, Conference of American Armies. All of them made the Soviet Union and communism the greatest threat to the status quo of the continent. 
9Primera Reunión de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional. Santiago de Chile, 29 october 1975. Fotograma 00022F0153.URL <http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239b/PDF/19751000%20Primera%20reunion%20de%20Trabajo%20de%20Inteligencia%20Nacional.pdf> [accessed 11 
february 2010] 
10Primera Reunión de Trabajo de Inteligencia Nacional. Santiago de Chile, 29 october 1975. Fotograma 00022F0153. URL <http://www.gwu.edu/
~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239b/PDF/19751000%20Primera%20reunion%20de%20Trabajo%20de%20Inteligencia%20Nacional.pdf> [accessed 11 
february 2010]. 
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They portrayed subversion as bearer of destruc-
tive project of both values and western and Christian 
principles: “Subversion for some years now can be 
found in our continent supported by political-economic 
ideas which are essentially against History, Philosophy, 
Religion and the costumes of the countries in our hemi-
sphere.” 
After the first meeting, there was a second one 
in which representatives from every country belonging 
to the entente gathered together reunited in Buenos 
Aires (December 1976) to revise past actions and talk 
about future plans. The main subject of the agenda was 
operations planning “against lefty groups and extrem-
ists (…) to fight terrorism and subversion.”11 During 
the year that went by between both meetings, the argen-
tine coup occurred (March 1976). Argentina was the 
only member country of Condor Operation whose State 
power was not yet directly controlled by the army. 
However, we must not ignore the colonization of the 
repressive machinery by terrorism’s own ways; its clear 
indication is the existence of semi-official force 
(consisting of members of the security forces and fi-
nanced by the Social Welfare Ministry), the Argentine 
Anti-Communist Alliance, that ever since 1973 had car-
ried out 2000 political murders (Amnistía Internacional, 
1976), and the exercise of the repression executed in 
the Independence Operation “so as to destroy the sub-
versive element in the bud” (Decreto número 
261/1975).12 
By the time all countries were involved in the 
combined repression under a military ruler, the US 
State Department contacted the American ambassador 
in Buenos Aires to inform him: “You are aware of a se-
ries of reports on “Operation Condor”. The coordina-
tion of security and intelligence information is probably 
understandable. However, government planned and di-
rected assassinations within and outside the territory of 
Condor members.”13 
The existence of such units as the one in Paris, 
and the disappearances of Argentine, Brazilian, Bolivi-
an, Chilean, Paraguayan and Uruguayan citizens in far 
off countries, demonstrate a persecutory offensive of 
pursuit and control with an exemplary pedagogy as a 
message. The strategy which distinguished that opera-
tion comprises a directionality of subjection, of subju-
gation by means of fear. The clandestine imprison-
ments, the systematic torture, the murder, the pursuit 
are all part of a political tactic, a tool of control 
(Foucault, 1987) that goes beyond a number of spread 
facts: violence and State Terrorism are the core of logic 
of power. 
To sum up 
 The problems and objectives stated in this essay 
were developed by means of a historical reconstruction, 
during which an analytic follow up of the specific part 
of any process was favored, its translation as a concep-
tion and sociopolitical practice which was presented in 
a rational, elaborated and articulated project. 
The projection and subsequent colonization of 
the logic claiming that the constitutional and legal 
mechanisms were less and less efficient to keep securi-
ty, as well as the multiplication of restriction, control, 
and the repressive practices to holdback, stop or vio-
lently punish the political and social actions of subver-
11Opiniones sobre la Operación Cóndor. 18 april 1977. URL <http://foia.state.gov/documents/Pcia/9d23.pdf> [accessed 16 february 2010]. 
12Decreto número 261/1975, 5 february; ordering execute military operations necessary for the purposes to neutralize and /or destroy the actions of sub-
versive elements acting in Tucumán province. And decreto 2.772/1975, 6 october; by which orders execution of military operations waged and Securi-
ty to remove or destroy the action of all subversive elements the territory of country. 
13Despacho inmediato a: Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay. 18 de agosto de 1976. Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. URL <http://
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB312/5_19760823_Operation_Condor.PDF> [accessed 11 february 2010] 
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sion are the core from where the new model of State 
was established. The tool of State coercion incorporates 
their traditional tasks (public and legal), other ones of 
clandestine nature, with massive crime and terror as a 
fundamental method. The component of secrecy had as 
its objective a strong intimidator factor, the attack on 
some groups extended on the whole community. That is 
to say, the whole community became the addressee of 
an intimidator action in which terror achieved tran-
scendence as a way of social control by means of fear 
(Duhalde, 1983). 
The intensity and the political power with which 
state terrorism was created and the nature of the 
searched transformations turn it into part of a program 
of total restructuration of the social organization. Un-
like what happened in the constitutional order interrup-
tions, during which the rights and the civil and political 
liberties were suspended, the complete re-foundation of 
the society became a goal under the protection of State 
terrorism. 
Even though each national process has its own 
feature that responds to the actors and elements that 
intervene, at the moment when persecutory violence of 
State was practiced, we must not forget the regional 
integration. The repressive and disciplinary strategies 
of the State Terrorism as part of a security policy that 
ended up in a counterrevolutionary action means a re-
definition of spatial parameters. The transnationaliza-
tion of State Terrorism, that is, the expansive and inter-
national character of a persecutory and stigmatic logic 
that, in terms of the Southern cone, meant the establish-
ment of ideological frontiers and made the army coop-
eration possible. 
To sum up, in an attempt to discipline and or-
ganize each one of the national societies, the different 
dictatorships used the organic, systematic and state-
owned repression. By means of ruthless and sophisti-
cated ways, they tried to achieve a submission to hierar-
chic order. For the first time in the political history of 
the southern cone, a machinery of counterrevolutionary 
State war was brought into operation whose most sig-
nificant feature was the supranational coordination; the 
cooperation of the army and the security intern of do-
mestic security; with a clear killing eagerness, which 
reached an objective realization through the disappear-
ance of people and the dissemination of terror beyond 
national frontiers and ideological limits. 
Once the goal was established, killing off the 
other, that is, guilty of subversion and where it was 
murdering the only thing they were after, the duty car-
ried out justified the means. The justification simply 
lies in the victory against the negative concept of the 
other. Some of the consequences of this attitude are un-
predictable since the State part is defined in an exclu-
sive way whose aim becomes incompatible with every-
body else’s aim. They get rid of individuals 
(subversive) for the sake of nation, which Arendt de-
fines as manufacturing humanity. That would mean the 
achievement of a cultural and social succeeding in uni-
ty: people with different and disintegrated wills, with 
heterogeneous goals gather together with a unique aim, 
with a unified view of the world and wishing the same 
future (Gramsci, 1977, pp. 388-396). 
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